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Abstract
Simulation models of the Reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma have been popu-
lar for studying the evolution of cooperation since more than 30 years now.
However, there have been practically no successful instances of empirical
application of any of these models. At the same time this lack of empirical
testing and confirmation has almost entirely been ignored by the modelers
community. In this paper, I examine some of the typical narratives and
standard arguments with which these models are justified by their authors
despite the lack of empirical validation. I find that most of the narratives
and arguments are not at all compelling. None the less they seem to serve
an important function in keeping the simulation business running despite its
empirical shortcomings.
Keywords: Evolution of Cooperation, Social Simulations, History of
Simulations
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1 Introduction
Simulation models of the Reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (in the following: RPD-
models) are since 30 years considered as one of the standard tools to study the
evolution of cooperation (Rangoni, 2013) (Hoffmann, 2000). A considerable
number of such simulation models has been produced by scientists. Unfortunately,
though, none of these models has empirically been verified and there exists no
example of empirical research where any of the RPD-models has successfully been
employed to a particular instance of cooperation. Surprisingly, this has not kept
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scientists from continuing to produce simulation models in the same tradition and
from writing their own history as a history of success. In a recent simulation study
– which does not make use of the RPD but otherwise follows the same pattern of
research – Robert Axelrod’s (Axelrod, 1984) original role model for this kind of
simulation studies is praised as “an extremely effective means for investigating the
evolution of cooperation” and considered as “widely credited with invigorating
that field” (Rendell et al., 2010b, 208-209).
According to a very widespread philosophy of science that is usually associated
with the name of Karl Popper (1971) science is distinguished from non-science
by its empirical testability and right theories from wrong theories by their actual
empirical success. Probably, most scientists in the field of social simulations would
even agree to this philosophy of science at least in its general outlines.1 However,
RPD models of the evolution of cooperation have not been empirically successful.
So, how come that they are still considered as valuable?
In this paper I am going to examine the question, why the continuous lack
of empirical success did not lead the scientists working with these simulation
models to reconsider their approach. In the first part I explain what RPD-models
of the evolution of cooperation are about. I show that these models failed to
produce empirically applicable and tenable results. This will be done by referring
to research reports and meta-studies, none of which comes up with an example of
successful empirical application.
In the second part of the paper, I highlight a few example cases that show why
these models fail. In this context I examine the framing narratives with which
1A referee pointed out to me that there is a tension in my paper between the reliance on a
Popperian falsificationism and the implicit use of Kuhn’s paradigm concept. However, both can be
reconciled if the former is understood in a normative and the latter in a descriptive sense. Popper’s
falsificationism requires, though, that paradigms are not completely incommensurable. But then,
there are many good reasons that speak against a strong reading of the incommensurability-thesis,
anyway.
Similarly, the Duhem-Quine-thesis does not result in a fatal problem for a Popperian epistemology,
if one admits that in most concrete contexts there exist further clues which allow to decide which
particular elements of a falsified set of propositions are more likely to be responsible than others.
For example, if an experiment falsifies a well established physical theory then it is prima facie more
likely that a loose wire was the cause than a failure of the theory. Only after this has been checked
carefully one would assign different probabilities to the experimental setup or the theory being
false, respectively. See the very enlightening remarks about Kuhn and Duhem-Quine in the case
study by Zacharias (2013, 11ff., 305ff.).
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scientists justify their method. Such framing narratives form an integral part of any
scientific enterprise. My point is not to criticize simulation scientists for employing
narratives to justify their method, but I believe that the typical framing narratives
that RPD modelers in the tradition of Axelrod employ of are badly founded and I
show that in each case there are good arguments against accepting the narrative.
In the third part of this paper I take this analysis one step further by discussing
typical arguments with which scientists justify the production and use of unvali-
dated “theoretical” simulations. Most of the arguments discussed here do usually
not form the central topic of scientific papers. Rather, they appear in the less
formal communication of scientists, in oral discussions, in small talk, eventually
in keynote addresses (Epstein, 2008). One may object that if these arguments
are never explicitly spelled out, they may not be worth discussing. After all they
have never been cast into their strongest imaginable form. Why discuss dinner
table talk, anyway? But then, it is often this kind of communication where the
deeper convictions of a community are expressed. And it is by no means true that
these convictions are without effect on the scientific judgments of the community
members. Quite to the contrary, general agreement with the underlying convictions
is silently presupposed by one’s scientific peers and adherence to them is usually
taken for granted by supervisors from their PhD students and often expected by ref-
erees from the authors of the papers they review. Therefore, the informal side-talk
of science should not at all be exempt from rational criticism.
In the last part of the paper, I relate my criticism to similar discussions in
a neighboring (if not overlapping) science, namely political science. It seems
that there exist structural similarities in the way scientific schools or research
traditions deal with failures of their paradigm. Rather than admitting such a
fundamental failure (which, as it touches one’s own scientific world view, is
obviously much harder than admitting the failure of a particular research enterprise
within a paradigm) they retreat by adjusting their goals. In the worst case they
become so modest in their achievements (which they, by an equal adjustment of
their self-perception, continue to celebrate as successes) that they reach the verge
of irrelevance. Green and Shapiro (1994, 44f.) have described this process of
clandestine retreat for the case of rational choice theory in political science.
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2 The empirical failure of simulations of the evolu-
tion of cooperation
2.1 Axelrod’s “The Evolution of Cooperation”
One of the most important initiators of the research on the RPD-model was Robert
Axelrod. The publication of his book “The Evolution of Cooperation” popularized
the simulation approach to studying the evolution of cooperation. At the core of
Axelrod’s simulation lies the two person’s Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The two
person’s Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game, where two players are asked to contribute
to the production of a public good. Each player can choose to either contribute,
that is, to cooperate, or not to contribute, that is to defect. If both players cooperate
they both receive a reasonably high payoff. If neither player cooperates, they both
receive a low payoff. If one player tries to cooperate while the other player defects,
the player who tried to cooperate receives a zero payoff, while the successful
cheater receives the highest possible payoff in the game, which at the same time is
more than the cooperative payoff. Since, no matter what the other player does, it is
always more advantageous for each individual player not to cooperate. Therefore,
both players, if they are rational egoists, end up with the low non-cooperation
payoff – at least as long as the game is not repeated. The reiterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (RPD), in which the same players play through a sequence of Prisoner’s
Dilemmas, changes the situation, because defecting players can be punished with
non-cooperation in the following rounds.
It can be shown that in the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma there is no single
best strategy. In order to find out if there exist certain strategies that are by
and large more successful than other strategies and whether there are certain
characteristics that successful strategies share, Robert Axelrod (1984) conducted
a computer tournament with different strategies. Axelrod also fed the results of
the tournament simulation into a population dynamical simulation, where more
successful strategies would gradually out-compete less successful strategies in
a quasi-evolutionary race. Famously, TIT FOR TAT emerged as the winner in
Axelrod’s tournament.2
2More detailed descriptions of the RPD-model and Axelrod’s tournament can be found in
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The way Axelrod employed his model as a research tool was by running
simulations and then generalizing from the results he obtained. These included
recommendations such as that TIT FOR TAT usually is good choice for a strategy
or that a strategy should not defect unmotivated itself, but should punish defections
and should also be forgiving etc. As subsequent research revealed, however, almost
none of these conclusions was in fact generalizable (see Arnold (2013, 106ff.,
126f.) with further references). For each of them there exist variations of the RPD-
model where it does not hold and where following Axelrod’s recommendations
could be a bad mistake. The only exception is Axelrod’s result about the collective
stability of TIT FOR TAT, which he proved mathematically.
The central flaw of Axelrod’s research design is that it relies strongly on
impressionistic conclusions and inductive generalizations from what are in fact
contingent simulation results. This deficiency of Axelrod’s model has convincingly
been criticized by Binmore (1998, 313ff.). To give just one example: In Axelrod’s
tournament TIT FOR TAT won in two subsequent rounds. Axelrod concluded that
TIT FOR TAT is a good strategy and that it is advisable to be forgiving. However,
if one chooses the set of all 2-state automata as strategy set – which is a reasonable
choice because it contains all strategies up to a certain complexity level – then the
unforgiving strategy GRIM emerges as the winner (Binmore, 1994, 295ff.).
Axelrod’s followers would usually be much more cautious about drawing
general conclusions from simulations, but they did not completely refrain from
generalizing. In the ensuing research a historical pattern emerged where researchers
would pick up existing models, investigate variants of these models, and eventually
demonstrate that the previous results could not be generalized (Schu¨ßler’s and
Arnold’s simulations, which are discussed below, are examples for this pattern).
Thus, Axelrod’s research design became – despite its great deficiencies – a role
model for simulation studies until today. As a justification for publishing yet
another model, it would usually suffice to relate to the previous research. No
reference to empirical research or just empirical applicability would be considered
necessary. For example, Rangoni (2013) introduces his study of a variant of the
RPD-model by mentioning that “Axelrod’s work on the prisoner’s dilemma is one
of the most discussed models of social cooperation” and declaring that “After more
Axelrod (1984), Binmore (1994, 1998) or Arnold (2008).
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than thirty years from the publication of its early results, Axelrod’s prisoner’s
dilemma tournament remains a cornerstone of evolutionary explanation of social
cooperation”, although – as will be discussed in the following – this “cornerstone of
evolutionary explanation” has not been confirmed empirically in a single instance.
2.2 The empirical failure of the RPD-model
Axelrod himself was confident that simulation studies like his yield knowledge
that can be applied in the context of empirical application. In his book “The
Evolution of Cooperation” (Axelrod, 1984) he provided two case studies. One
of these concerned biology. It was of highly speculative character as Axelrod
honestly admitted and it has indeed never been confirmed since. Therefore, I am
not going to discuss this particular case study here. Further biological research on
the evolution of cooperation will briefly be outlined below.
The other one of Axelrod’s case studies was a highly dramatic case study
concerning the Live and Let Live System which emerged on some stretches of the
deadlocked western front between enemy soldiers in World War One. However, as
acknowledged by Axelrod his case study relies entirely on the prior historiographic
work by Tony Ashworth (1980). Based on an extensive study of the historical
sources, Ashworth had crafted a careful and highly differentiated explanation for
the emergence, sustainment and eventual breakdown of the Live and Let Live
on the western front. Axelrod’s recasting of this story in game theoretical terms
has nothing to add in terms of explanatory power, because the RPD-model is far
too simple to account for the complicated network of causes for the Live and
Let Live that Ashworth study had revealed (Arnold, 2008, 180ff.). Even among
game theorists it was disputed, whether there existed any straight-forward way
to interpret the situation as a Prisoner’s Dilemma at all (Schu¨ßler, 1997, 33ff.).
Thus, if any particular scientific approach is to be credited with the successful
explanation of the Live and Let Live in World War One, then it is not game
theoretical modeling or computer simulations but the well-established methods of
traditional historiography. Interestingly, though, this dramatic case-study did a lot
to increase the popularity of Axelrod’s simulation approach.
If Axelrod’s attempts to apply his model to empirical case studies weren’t
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particularly successful, then subsequent research could still demonstrate that the
empirical application of these models is possible. The most noteworthy attempt
to apply the RPD empirically was undertaken by Manfred Milinski (1987), who
sought to explain the seemingly cooperative behavior that shoal fishes show when
inspecting a predator. This paper is quoted time and again when it comes to
giving an example for the empirical applicability of the RPD model. For example,
Hoffman maintains in a research report about Axelrod’s RPD framework that
“This general framework is applicable to a host of realistic scenarios both in the
social and natural worlds (e.g. Milinski 1987).” (Hoffmann, 2000, 4.3). Milinski’s
1987-paper, however, remains the sole example for the “host of realistic scenarios”
to which this framework is supposedly applicable. The same paper by Milinski
is quoted in Osborne’s “Introduction to Game Theory” as an example for the
empirical applicability of game theory (Osborne, 2004, 445). Unfortunately, it
was already by the late 1990s clear that Milinski’s explanation of the predator
inspection behavior did not work (Dugatkin, 1997, 1998). The reason is that it is
not possible to obtain the necessary empirical data to either confirm or disconfirm
the RPD model in the case of the predator inspection behavior of sticklebacks.
This is also more or less the conclusion at which Milinski and Parker arrive in a
joint paper on the same topic that they published 10 years after the initial study by
Milinski (Milinski and Parker, 1997, 1245).
In a broad meta-study on the research on “Cooperation among Animals” Lee
Allan Dugatkin (1997) does not find a single instance of animal cooperation where
any of the many variants of the RPD model (Dugatkin lists more than two dozens
of them in the beginning of his study) can successfully be applied. He summarizes
the situation in a very thoughtful article as follows: “Despite the fact that game
theory has a long standing tradition in the social sciences, and was incorporated
in behavioral ecology 20 years ago, controlled tests of game theory models of
cooperation are still relatively rare. It might be argued that this is not the fault
of the empiricists, but rather due to the fact that much of the theory developed is
unconnected to natural systems and thus may be mathematically intriguing but
biologically meaningless” (Dugatkin and Reeve, 1998, 57). The same frustration
about empirically ungrounded model research is expressed by Peter Hammerstein:
“Why is there such a discrepancy between theory and facts? A look at the best
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known examples of reciprocity shows that simple models of repeated games do
not properly reflect the natural circumstances under which evolution takes place.
Most repeated animal interactions do not even correspond to repeated games.”
(Hammerstein, 2003, 83). It is safe to say that there exist no successful empirical
application cases for the RPD in biology. But the fact that the modeling community
still entertains the believe that there are such successful application cases, if not
“a host of” them, clearly demonstrates how little, in fact, the community occupies
itself with empirical matters.
3 Justificatory narratives
If the simulations studies in this research tradition do not bear any explanatory
value for empirical research, then the question naturally arises what they are good
for. Some authors present explanations that are meant to justify the method. I
will go through some of them before entering on the discussion of the general
arguments in favor for the simulation method.
3.1 Axelrod’s narrative
Axelrod motivated the use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma mostly by the fact that it
already was an extremely popular game theoretical model that had already been
used in experimental economic research. He compares the Prisoner’s Dilemma
to the E.coli in biological research. Comparisons to the ever successful natural
sciences are quite typical for the justificatory discourse of the modeling approaches
in the social sciences. With the benefit of hindsight it can, however, be said that
this comparison was slightly misleading. E.coli is a great object of study in biology,
because what one learns when studying E.coli can often directly be transferred to
other bacteria. Many bacteria are similar to E.coli in important respects. The same
is unfortunately not true for the RPD model, which is not at all a robust model
(Arnold, 2013, 127f.). Change the parameters of the simulation, the initial set of
participating strategies or other aspects of the model only a bit and you can get
qualitatively different results. Most likely, another strategy than TIT FOR TAT
would turn out as winner, and maybe not even a friendly or cooperative strategy
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(Binmore, 1994, 315).
One part of Axelrod’s motivation is also a supposed advantage of the simulation
approach to experimental approaches. Axelrod relates to the notorious problem
of economic experimental research that the laboratory setting is usually highly
artificial and that, therefore, any obtained results cannot easily be transferred to
real life situations. He omits to mention, however, that computer simulations based
on highly stylized models like the RPD share the same problem.
3.2 Schu¨ßler’s narrative
Several years after Axelrod, Rudolf Schu¨ßler (1997) published a book with game
theoretical simulations. One part of this book directly relates to Axelrod. This part
of Schu¨ßler’s book follows the pattern: Pick a well-known simulation, change the
settings or other details of this simulations, produce “surprising” results and publish.
If Axelrod had demonstrated with his simulation that the shadow of the future is
crucial for the evolution of cooperation, Schu¨ßler demonstrates with a modified
simulation that this does not need to mean that the same partners must expect to
meet again and again in order to sustain cooperation. In Schu¨ßler’s simulation
cooperators succeed although cheaters can decide to break off the interaction at
any time, thus avoiding punishment.3
Given Axelrod’s previous simulations and conjectures this can appear surpris-
ing. But what is surprising? That a different simulation produces different results is
prima facie anything but surprising. Given the almost complete modeling freedom
– remember, there are no empirical constraints to be honored – and the volatility
of the original model it would be surprising if no surprises could be produced. So
why should we be interested in the results of another arbitrary simulation?
At this point Schu¨ßler’s narrative steps in. As Schu¨ßler (1997, 91) writes “One
of the central, classical assumptions of the normativistic sociology says that in
an exchange society of rational egoists no stable cooperation can emerge (see
Durkheim 1977, Parsons 1949). Alleged proofs for this thesis try to show that
3The details of this simulation are described in Schu¨ßler (1997, 61ff.) and in a simpler form in
Arnold (2008, 291ff.). For the curious: Schu¨ßler achieves his effect, because the non-cooperators
that break off the interaction are forced to pick a new partner from a pool that mostly contains
non-cooperators from which it is impossible to rip a high payoff.
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already simple analytical considerations suffice to draw this conclusion. The
present simulation should be able to shake this firm conviction.”4 One may wonder
whether this means that the simulation serves more than a purely didactic purpose.
But be that as it may. It is in any case questionable whether the premises are correct.
Do normativistic sociologists really rely on simple analytical considerations?
Sociologists like Durkheim usually argue on the basis of thick narratives supported
by empirical research. Highly abstract computer simulations like Rudolf Schu¨ßler’s
simulations can at best prove logical possibilities. However, it is unlikely that
this kind of discourse is vulnerable to proofs of logical possibilities. After all, a
normativistic sociologist can easily claim that the seeming possibility of rational
egoists to cooperate is an artifact of the simulations that strips away all concrete
features of human nature, especially those of a psychological kind which make
cooperation of egoists impossible in reality (Arnold, 2013, 128ff.). (Generally,
proofs of logical possibilities cannot disprove real impossibilities; e.g. a perpetuum
mobile is logically possible but impossible in reality, because it contradicts the
laws of nature. See Arnold (2013) for a detailed discussion of the category of
logical possibility.)
Schu¨ßler, who seems to be quite aware of the weaknesses of his argument,
follows up with the remark that ultimately it is up to the scientist to decide whether
this is sufficient or not (Schu¨ßler, 1997, 91). But as we have seen, proofs of logical
possibility are simply not sufficient. And then again, it is an indefeasible claim
that scientific knowledge is objective and that its validity is independent from the
opinions and discretion of any particular person. If it were up to the discretion
of the scientist to decide whether some theory or model is sufficient to decide a
scientific question, we would not call that science any more.
It is noteworthy that Schu¨ßler criticizes Axelrod quite strongly in the beginning
of his book (Schu¨ßler, 1997, 33ff.), but then presents computer simulations of
exactly the same brand as Axelrod’s simulations. The same kind of performative
4This is my translation. The German original reads: “Eine der zentralen, klassischen Annahmen
der normativistischen Soziologie besagt, daß in einer Austauschgesellschaft rationaler Egoisten
keine stabilen Kooperationsverha¨ltnisse entstehen ko¨nnen (vgl. Durkheim 1977, Parsons 1949).
Angebliche Nachweise fu¨r diese These versuchen zu zeigen, daß bereits einfache, analystische
U¨berlegungen zu diesem Schluß ausreichen. Die vorliegende Simulation sollte geeignet sein, diese
Sicherheit zu erschu¨ttern.” (Schu¨ßler, 1997, 91)
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self-contradiction is even more obvious in the following example.
3.3 The story of “slip stream altruism”
Although RPD simulations already fell out of fashion, I have myself published a
book with RPD simulations as late as 2008. I felt uneasy about it at the time of
writing the book and today I am even more convinced that the scientific method that
I describe (but also criticize) in this book is fundamentally flawed. But the book
was my PhD-thesis and I was not really given the free choice of topic – which is,
of course, a widespread grievance of PhD-theses. So, I figured that the best I could
make out of this situation was to follow the established pattern of research in this
field, but also to examine it from an epistemological point of view and point out
its deficiencies. The research pattern is that of producing a variant of an existing
simulation model, finding “interesting” results and embedding them in a narrative
that makes them appear “new”, “surprising” or at least somehow noteworthy.
In the series of population dynamical simulations of the RPD that I conducted,
there are quite a few simulations where naive cooperators, i.e. strategies that
cooperate but other than TIT FOR TAT do not retaliate when the partner fails to
reciprocate, can still survive with a low share of the population or – even more
“surprising” – come out on top, i.e. with larger population share than even the
retaliating cooperators (Arnold, 2008, 109ff.). I used the term “slip stream altruism”
as a catch phrase to describe this phenomenon, because the simulations prove the
logical possibility that unconditional altruism (which some moralists consider to
be the only form of altruism that deserves its name) can develop in the “slip stream”
of tough, reciprocating strategies.
But is this phenomenon really surprising and did we really need a series of
computer simulations to get the idea? As mentioned earlier, with unrestricted
modeling freedom and a volatile base model like the RPD, one is liable to find all
kinds of phenomena. There are not really any surprises. And just as in Schu¨ßler’s
case there is a simple explanation for the phenomenon: Unconditional cooperators
can come out on top, if the conditional cooperators that drive the non-cooperators to
extinction are badly coordinated so that they inadvertently hurt each other (Arnold,
2008, 113). So, the phenomenon that my simulation series yields acquires the
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appearance of being interesting, surprising or relevant mostly by the narrative and
the rhetoric of “slip stream altruism” in which it is embedded.
I never took the story of slip stream altruism very seriously and, as I said earlier,
I was already convinced that the simulation method as practiced by Axelrod and
his followers leads to nothing at the time when I wrote the book down. (See, for
example, my talk at the Models & Simulations in Paris 2006, some time before I
wrote down the book (Arnold, 2006).) Given how strongly I criticize Axelrod-style
simulations in the book, it may appear odd to the readers that I even bothered to
conduct computer simulations of the same brand and describe them in the book.
As mentioned earlier, this was a tribute that I had to pay to the circumstances.
Somewhat to my distress I later found that some readers liked the simulation series
much better than my criticism of the method (Schurz, 2011, 344, 356). Others, at
least, have understood that the main purpose of the book is a critical one (Zollman,
2009). In my (biased) opinion, however, I believe that the criticism or, what
amounts to the same, the deficiencies of the simulation method as practiced by the
adherents of Axelrod have not yet been taken seriously enough.
3.4 The social learning strategies tournament
The last example of a justificatory narrative does not concern the RPD model, but
a simulation enterprise that is similar in spirit to Axelrod’s. The authors of this
study explicitly refer to Axelrod for the justification of their approach (Rendell
et al., 2010b, 208-209). The model at the basis of the “Social Learning Strategies
tournament” is a 100-armed bandit model (Rendell et al., 2010a, 30ff.). Just like
the RPD it is a highly stylized and very sparse model: The model assumes an
environment with 100 cells representing foraging opportunities. The payoff from
foraging is distributed exponentially: few high payoffs, many low or even zero
payoffs. In each round of the game the players can choose between three possible
moves: INNOVATE where they receive information about the payoff opportunity
in a randomly picked cell; EXPLOIT where players forage one of their known
cells to receive a payoff; OBSERVE where a player receives slightly imprecise
information about the foraging opportunities that other players are exploiting.
Arbitrarily many players can occupy one cell. The resources never expire, but
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the environment changes over time so that the players’ information about good
foraging opportunities gets outdated after a while. The payoffs drive a population
dynamical model where players live and die and are replaced by new players
depending on the success of the existing players.
The most important result of the tournament was that – under the conditions of
this specific model – the best strategies relied almost entirely on social learning, i.e.
playing OBSERVE. It almost did not make any sense at all to play INNOVATE.5
Other than that the ratio between OBSERVE moves and EXPLOIT moves was
crucial to success. Too few OBSERVE moves would lead to sticking with poor
payoffs. Too many OBSERVE moves would mean that payoffs would not be
gathered often enough which results in a lower average payoff. Finally, the right
estimate of expected payoffs was important. The winning strategy and the second
best strategy used the same probabilistic standard formula to estimate the expected
payoff values (Rendell et al., 2010b, 211).
The authors themselves make every effort to present their findings as a sort
of scientific novelty. For that purpose they employ a framing narrative that links
their model with an important research question, prior research and successful (or
believed to be successful) past role models. The broader research question, men-
tioned in the beginning of the paper, to which the model is related is how cultural
learning has contributed to the success of humans as a species: “Cultural processes
facilitate the spread of adaptive knowledge, accumulated over generations, allowing
individuals to acquire vital life skills. One of the foundations of culture is social
learning,...” (Rendell et al., 2010b, 208). Surely, this is a worthwhile scientific
question.
As to the prior research they refer to theoretical studies. These, however, only
“have explored a small number of plausible learning strategies” (Rendell et al.,
2010b). Therefore, the tournament was conducted which gathers a contingent
but large selection of strategies. The tournament’s results are then described as
“surprising results, given that the error-prone nature of social learning is widely
thought to be a weakness of this form of learning ... These findings are particularly
5This was partly due to an inadvertency in the design of the model, where OBSERVE moves
could – due to random errors – serve much the same function as INNOVATE moves. The authors
of the study did, however, verify that their results are not just due to this particular effect (Rendell
et al., 2010a, 21f.).
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unexpected in the light of previous theoretical analyzes ..., virtually all of which
have posited some structural cost to asocial learning and errors in social learning.”
(Rendell et al., 2010b, 212).
Thus, the results of the tournament constitute a novelty, even a surprising
novelty. The surprising character of the results is strongly underlined by the
authors of the study: “The most important outcome of the tournament is the
remarkable success of strategies that rely heavily on copying when learning in spite
of the absence of a structural cost to asocial learning, an observation evocative of
human culture. This outcome was not anticipated by the tournament organizers,
nor by the committee of experts established to oversee the tournament, nor, judging
by the high variance in reliance on social learning ..., by most of the tournament
entrants.” (Rendell et al., 2010b, 212) Again, however, it is not surprising, but to
be expected that one reaches results that differ form previous research if one uses a
different model.
Axelrod’s tournament plays an important role as historical paragon in the fram-
ing narrative: “The organization of similar tournaments by Robert Axelrod in
the 1980s proved an extremely effective means for investigating the evolution of
cooperation and is widely credited with invigorating that field.”(Rendell et al.,
2010b, 208). But as mentioned earlier, the general conclusions that Axelrod drew
from his tournament had already turned out not to be tenable and the research
tradition he initiated did not really yield any empirically applicable simulation mod-
els. Nonetheless, the authors seem to consider it as an advantage that: “Axelrod’s
cooperation tournaments were based on a widely accepted theoretical framework
for the study of cooperation: the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” (Rendell et al., 2010b, 209).
However, the wide acceptance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma model says more about
fashions in science than about the explanatory power of this model. Although not
as widely accepted as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the authors are confident that “the
basic generality of the multi-armed bandit problem we posed lends confidence
that the insights derived from the tournament may be quite general.” (Rendell
et al., 2010b, 212). But the generality of the problem does not guarantee that
the conclusions are generalizable beyond the particular model that was used to
describe the problem. Quite the contrary, the highly stylized and abstract character
of the model raises doubts whether it will be applicable without ambiguity in many
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empirical instances. The generality of the model does not imply – nor should it, as
I believe, lend any confidence in that direction to the cautious scientist – that it is
of general relevance for the explanation of empirical instances of social and asocial
learning. This simply remains to be seen. If anything at all then it is its robustness
with respect to changes of the parameter values that lends some confidence in
the applicability of the tournament’s results. Robustness is of course only one of
several necessary prerequisites for the empirical applicability of a model.
Summing it up, it is mostly in virtue of its framing narrative that the tourna-
ment’s results appear as a novel, important or surprising theoretical achievement.
If one follows the line of argument given here, however, then the model – being
hardly empirically grounded and not at all empirically validated – represents just
one among many other possible ways of modeling social learning. In this respect it
is merely another grain of dust in the inexhaustible space of logical possibilities.
4 Bad excuses for bad methods and why they are
wrong
While the narratives discussed so far could be traced to their specific sources in
the papers and books in which they appear, the following standard arguments for
the supposed superiority of the simulation approach to studying the “evolution of
cooperation” or for the use of formal models crop up in discussions and the less
formal forms of scientific communication, but not so often in scientific papers.
I have heard all of these arguments in discussions about the RPD simulation
model more than once, but I cannot easily trace them back to printed sources.
As I explained in the introduction, these arguments seem to me none the less to
represent an attitude that effects the scientific work. Therefore, I believe that they
deserve discussion.
4.1 “Our knowledge is limited, anyway”
Argument: Our ability to gain knowledge is limited in the social sciences, anyway.
Therefore, we have to be content with the kind of computer simulations we can
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make, even if they are not sufficient to generate empirical explanations.
Response: No one says that we have to use computer simulations in the social
sciences. If computer simulations do not work, other methods may still work.
As explained earlier, the “Live and Let Live” in World War One cannot really be
explained by RPD models, but historiographic methods still work perfectly well in
this case.
Even if there exist no alternative methods, we should not accept the existing
methods no matter how bad they are. The use of a particular scientific method is
justified only, if the results it yields are better than mere speculation and by and
large as good as or better than what can be achieved with alternative methods.
Moreover, we should not mistake the failure of a paradigm – say, agent-based
simulations or RPD-simulations of cooperation or rational choice theory or so-
ciobiology – for the failure of a science. It is only from the keyhole perspective
of the strict adherents to one particular paradigm that the limits of the paradigm
appear as the limits of the science or of human cognition as such. In this respect
the argument resembles the strategy of silent retreat to false modesty mentioned in
the introduction. While it is laudable for a scientist to be modest about one’s own
claims of knowledge, scientific modesty becomes inappropriate when it gives up
any claim of generating empirically falsifiable knowledge.
4.2 “One can always learn something from failure”
Argument: Even if Axelrod’s approach ultimately turned out to be a failure, we can
still learn important lessons from it. Failure is at least as important for the progress
of science as success.
Response: Unfortunately, it is not clear, whether the necessary lessons have al-
ready been learned. If Axelrod’s computer tournament is still remembered as an
“extremely effective means for investigating the evolution of cooperation” (Rendell
et al., 2010b, 208) by the scientific community then it seems that the lessons
have not been learned. And even if the lessons have been learned (by some) then
the many dozens of inapplicable simulations that have kept scientists busy in the
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aftermath of Axelrod’s book have surely been a rather long detour.
4.3 “Models always rely on simplification”
Argument: Models, by their very definition, rely on simplifications of reality. If a
model wouldn’t simplify it would be useless as a model. After all, the best map of
a landscape would be the landscape itself, but then it would be useless as a map.
(A typical example is Zollman (2009) who relies on this argument in his criticism
of mine. See also Green and Shapiro (1994, 191) who discuss a similar argument
in the context of rational choice theory.)
Response: On the other hand it is obvious that there must be some limit to how
strongly a model may simplify reality. For otherwise any model could be a model
for anything. So, where is the borderline between legitimate simplification and
illegitimate oversimplification? A possible answer could be that a model is not
oversimplified as long as it captures with sufficient precision all causally relevant
factors of the modeled phenomenon with respect to a specific research question,
i.e. all factors that are liable to determine the outcome of this question. In all other
cases we should be very careful to trust an explanation based on that model alone.
At this point two replies are common: 1) That no one claims such an explanatory
power for his or her own models. But then, what is the point of modeling, if models
do not help us to explain anything? 2) That the research question did not require
that all causally relevant factors have to be captured by one and the same model.
However, if a model concentrates only on some causal factors, then these must
at least be discernible empirically from other factors at work. Unfortunately, this
is often not possible and certainly not with most RPD models. (See also Arnold
(2014, 367f.).)
As far as RPD-simulations are concerned it appears clear to me that these are
far too simplified to be acceptable representations of reality. One could object that
they help us to understand the mechanism of reciprocal altruism as such. This
is already one step back from claiming that RPD-models are an effective means
for investigating the evolution of cooperation, because now it is merely claimed
that they are illustrating a mechanism. However, for this purpose a single model
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would be sufficient. One does not need dozens of them. Plus, how and why
reciprocal altruism works in principle has perfectly well been conceptualized by
Robert Trivers (1971) many years earlier with a single simple equation.
4.4 “There are no alternatives to modeling”
Argument: There is no real alternative to modeling, anyway. If you try to do
without models, merely relying on verbal explanations, you are just making use of
implicit models that are never fully articulated. Surely, explicit modeling is better
than relying on implicit models. Without models nothing could be explained. (See
also Epstein (2008), who employs a variant of this argument.)
Response: It is at least for the time being (the distant future of science may of course
prove me wrong) practically impossible to express everything that can be expressed
verbally in mathematical terms or with formal logic. This includes many of the
causal connections that we are interested in when doing social sciences. Otherwise,
how come that among the many books published about the causes, course and
consequences of the First World War these days, there is no game theoretical or
otherwise model-based study that could rival the conventional historical treatments?
Otherwise, how come that lawyers, attorneys and judges – their job being to a
large part one of logical reasoning, as one should think – do not use formal logic to
express the legal connections they ponder over?
4.5 “Modeling promotes a scientific habit of mind”
Argument: “To me, however, the most important contribution of the modeling
enterprise – as distinct from any particular model, or modeling technique – is that
it enforces a scientific habit of mind, which I would characterize as one of militant
ignorance – an iron commitment to ’I don’t know.’ That is, all scientific knowledge
is uncertain, contingent, subject to revision, and falsifiable in principle. (This, of
course, does not mean readily falsified. It means that one can in principle specify
observations that, if made, would falsify it). One does not base beliefs on authority,
but ultimately on evidence. This, of course, is a very dangerous idea. It levels the
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playing field, and permits the lowliest peasant to challenge the most exalted ruler –
obviously an intolerable risk.” (Epstein, 2008, 1.16)
Response: Unfortunately, the modeling tradition discussed in this paper failed
completely with respect to all the virtues that Epstein naively believes to be virtues
promoted by modeling: It did not readily submit its results to empirical falsification.
Where the few and far between attempts of empirical application have been made
and failed, the modelers did not learn from failure. (The empirical scientists did
learn from the failure by turning away from the RPD-models.) The commitment to
“I do not know” becomes a joke if modelers do not dare to come up with concrete
empirical explanations or predictions any more. And as far as authority goes, the
appeal to “scientific authority” in more or less subtle forms is a common rhetoric
device in the modeler’s discourse. (See also Moses and Knutsen (2012, 157), Green
and Shapiro (1994, 195) and argument 7 below).
Generally, the scientific habit of mind does not at all depend on the use of
models. Also, secondary virtues like clarity, explicitness and the like are by
no means a prerogative of modelers. Computer simulation studies in particular
can become dangerously unclear if the source code is not published or not well
structured or not well commented.
4.6 “Division of labor in science exempts theoreticians from
empirical work”
Argument: There exists division of labor in science. Model builders are not respon-
sible for the empirical application of their models, but they are mere suppliers. If
the empirical scientists fail to test or otherwise make use of models, it is not the
modelers that should be blamed.
Response: But modelers need to take into account the conditions and restrictions
that empirical research imposes, otherwise they run the danger of producing mod-
els that can never, not even under the most favorable circumstances, be applied
empirically. In the case of the Axelrod-tradition it is clearly the modelers that must
take the blame, because they failed to learn from the failures of early attempts at
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empirical application like Milinski’s (1987). And they never worried about the
restrictions under which empirical work struggles in the potential application fields
of their models.
Now, one might say that this is also true for much of mathematics, and still
mathematics has often proven to be applicable, even in cases that no one had
guessed before. But surely it is not a good research strategy to rely on later to
come historical coincidences of science. Plus, there is an important difference
between mathematics and models. Mathematics deals with general structures, while
simulation-models like the RPD represent particular example cases (comparable
to a concrete calculation in mathematics). From a technical point of view most
models in the Axelrod tradition remain fairly trivial, while mathematics could – if
worst comes to worst – still be justified by its high intellectual level which allows
to ascribe an innate value to it.
4.7 “Success within the scientific community proves scientific
validity”
Argument: The scientific value of computer simulations in the social sciences
cannot be disputed. There is a growing number of research projects, journals,
institutes that is dedicated to social simulations. (Variants of this argument are:
This book has been quoted so many times, it cannot be all wrong! Or, this article
has been published in Science, the authors surely know what they are doing. See
also Green and Shapiro (1994, 195), who discuss a similar argument.)
Response: The scientific value of a method, theory, model or simulation is to be
judged exclusively on the basis of its scientific merits, i.e. logical reasoning and
empirical evidence, and not at all on the basis of its social success. As far as
computer simulations are concerned, a survey by Heath, Hill and Ciarallo (2009)
on agent-based simulations revealed that the empirical validation of computer
simulations is still badly lacking.
There is one grain of truth in this argument. For those questions, about which
one does not know enough to judge the scientific arguments it is best to rely on the
judgment of the socially approved specialists. But social success can never be used
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as an argument within a scientific dispute. After all, it is just the question whether
the social success of a theory, model or paradigm was deserved from a scientific
point of view.
4.8 “Natural sciences do it just the same way”
Argument: The use of models is pervasive throughout the natural sciences and in
particular physics. Now, the natural sciences have been extremely successful and
continuously progressing since their very inception in early modern times. Why
should not social sciences learn from the successful methods of the natural sciences
and employ models?
Response: So physicists do it just the same way? Nay, they don’t! Throughout
the natural sciences it is common practice to test models and theories rigorously
against experiments and empirical observations. The success of the natural sciences
is not only due to mathematical modeling alone, but rather to the co-evolution of
mathematical theory and measurement technology.
However, even if social modelers were to apply the same standards of empirical
rigor as natural scientists, success is not at all guaranteed. For, it may be the case
that social life just does not follow any mathematical laws that are simple enough
for us to understand or any mathematical laws at all. It is a contingent fact that
physical nature follows laws that can be described mathematically. But there is
no necessity that this will turn out to be the case for all realms of being. God has
never promised that it would.
4.9 Concluding remarks
None of the arguments discussed above appear to be particularly pervasive in the
first place. Never the less I believe they are worth being discussed, because – like
the previously described narratives – they help to keep the spirits of the scientists
up even in face of apparent failure. Just like social prejudices they need to be made
explicit to be overcome.
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5 History repeats itself: Comparison with similar
criticisms of naturalistic or scientistic approaches
Although this paper was mostly dedicated to the case of RPD-simulations of
the evolution of cooperation, much of the criticism uttered here does not only
concern this specific research tradition. In some points it overlaps with like-minded
criticism of model oriented or “naturalistic” approaches in the social sciences. In
this last part, I’d like to point out some of these overlaps.
In a fundamental, though still constructive criticism Green and Shapiro (1994)
have described what they call the “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory”. The
idea that people are by and large rational actors is in itself not necessarily connected
to using mathematical models or simulations. But many of the pathologies that
Green and Shapiro describe seem to be tied to a particular complex of ontological
and methodological convictions lying at the base of the rational choice creed.
Among these is a strong commitment to mathematical methods, which are prima
facie considered to be more scientific than other methods. What is of interest in
this context is what happens when these convictions are frustrated, which they
must be, if on the basis of these convictions it is not possible to generate that
amount of solid and empirically supported scientific results that had been promised
and expected. Will the adherents of the school start to weaken or revise their
fundamental convictions? Green and Shapiro (1994, 33ff.) found out that, rather
then doing this, adherents of the school applied about any immunization strategy
imaginable to protect their theoretical commitment. These strategies ranged form
post-hoc theory development over projecting evidence from theory or searching
exclusively for confirming evidence to arbitrary domain restrictions. The latter is
of particular interest here, because it suggests a historical pattern that is analogous
to the one observed in the history of the evolution of cooperation and which I have
described as a retreat to false modesty.
According to Green and Shapiro (1994, 45) scientifically legitimate domain
restriction is distinguished from arbitrary domain restriction by “specifying the
relevant domain in advance by reference to limiting conditions”, rather than ”speci-
fying as the relevant domain: ’wherever the theory seems to work’ ”. This problem
has – according to their analysis – been particularly acute in the so called ”paradox
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of voter turnout”, which consists in the fact that people vote at political elections
even though the individual influence on the result is so marginal that any cost, even
that of leaving the house for voting, should exceed the expected benefit. Now,
rational choice theorists have never advanced any convincing explanation for this
alleged paradox. Rather, they moved from the question of why people vote to much
less ambitious explanations for turnout rate changes (Green and Shapiro, 1994, 59).
And even here they did not manage to advance more than quite unoriginal hypothe-
ses concerning, for example, the relation between education and the inclination to
vote.
In two respects this resembles my results about the scientific tradition of the
evolution of cooperation. First of all with regards to the triviality of the results
that the simulation-based approach produced in its later stage (like my own “slip
stream altruism”-story quoted above). Secondly, with respect to the stepping down
from great scientific promises to such humble results. Had Axelrod believed that
his simulation models have considerable explanatory power, many of his later
followers (e.g. Schu¨ßler) were so careful not to promise too much that one wonders
what the simulation method is good for in the context of finding explanations for
cooperative behavior, anyway. These coincidences between rational choice theory
and RPD-simulations are not surprising, if one assumes that they represent typical
immunization strategies of failing paradigms. One difference should be mentioned,
though. In the case of rational choice it was largely an empirical failure of the
theory, while in the case of the “evolution of cooperation” its was already the
failure not to compare the models to empirical research.
Another connection can be pointed out between the criticism launched here
and a more recent criticism of the naturalistic paradigm in the political sciences as
part of the textbook on competing methodologies in social and political research by
Moses and Knutsen (2012, 145-168). Moses and Knutson describe and (modestly)
criticize the interconnected complex of ontological and methodological beliefs
that makes up the naturalistic paradigm. This complex is composed of elements
which are not unlike those that I have discussed as arguments and narratives in
the two previous sections. One important element of these is the play with an
assumed scientific authority (Moses and Knutsen, 2012, 157ff.). Given the many
imponderables that surround any theory in the social sciences, including those
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that profess to employ strictly scientific methods like formal models, Moses and
Knutsen come to a similar result as I have: Namely, that this kind of professed
scientism is largely a bluff.
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